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S

ince the Vietnam War most military professionals have held a negative view
of the American media resulting, in no small way, from their perception that
the conduct of the war was taken out of the hands of military professionals and
placed in those of TV journalists. These attitudes have been nurtured by the
perceived role of the media in reporting such disparate phenomena as terrorist
incidents, the invasion of Grenada, the defense budget, and the Iran arms affair.
Although some members of the media have responded to such criticism, in
the main the views of the military profession have been ignored or minimized
by the media on the presumption that they are an aberration and not in accord
with the general views of society. Equally important, most members of the
media may be convinced that the military profession has little understanding
of the media and thus holds distorted and incorrect views.1 This unfriendly, if
not hostile, relationship tends to obscure the importance of more fundamental
questions regarding the military profession and the role of the media in an open
system. The purpose here is to examine four such questions. Is there a media
elite? Is there a media monopoly? What are the characteristics and mind-sets
of the media? What do the answers to these questions reflect regarding the US
military profession and the American media?
We now have available a number of solid published studies of the
media. The weight of evidence revealed by these studies shows that there exists
a media elite with a particular political and social predisposition that places it
distinctly left of center on the American political spectrum. Further, the media
elite enjoys a monopoly on news gathering and reporting, channeled through a
corporate structure that gives the media elite and media corporations immense
power in the American political system. Although there are contrary views, they
pale in comparison to the empirical and analytical bases of these conclusions.
Dr. Sam C. Sarkesian received his B.A. from The Citadel and his M.A. and Ph.D.
from Columbia University. He is currently professor of political science at Loyola
University of Chicago and Chairman of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces
and Society. Dr. Sarkesian has published widely on national security issues. His latest
book is The New Battlefield: The United States and Unconventional Conflicts. He served
for over 20 years as an enlisted man and officer in the US Army, with service in Germany,
Korea, and Vietnam, including duty with Special Forces, airborne, and infantry units.
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As one group of scholars observed, “There is considerable evidence from other
sources to corroborate our portrait of liberal leading journals.”2
It is reasonable to conclude, therefore, the military profession holds
views generally in accord with the conclusions reached by scholarly studies
of the media. And, in the main, the views of the military are compatible with
those of American society. This is true even though military officers may have
formed their views subjectively and intuitively. In contrast, the political and
social predispositions of the majority of those in the news profession and media
elite put them at a considerable distance from mainstream America. What
follows is a more detailed examination of the basis for these conclusions.

The Media Elite—Mind-sets and Power
Elites are normally characterized by their perceived status in society,
their relative homogeneity, the power they can command, the similarity of their
political-social backgrounds, and their commonality of purpose. Underpinning
these considerations is the fact that an elite tends to be self-contained and
self-regulating. Further, an elite is not necessarily determined by the numbers
involved, but more by the amount of power exercised in the system and relative
status. While there are some exceptions, those in the media who are at the
highest levels of their profession and occupy important positions in reporting
the news reflect all of the characteristics of an elite. Indeed, the members of the
media elite generally move in the same social circles, read the same literature,
and depend on similar sources for news.3
In one of the most authoritative studies of the media in recent times, by S.
Robert Lichter, Stanley Rothman, and Linda S. Lichter, the authors conducted:
hour-long interviews with 238 journalists at America’s most influential media outlets [New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street
Journal, Time, Newsweek, U.S. News and World Report, and the
news divisions of CBS, NBC, and PBS]. The result is a systematic
sample of men and women who put together the news at America’s
most important media outlets—the media elite . . . . The demographics are clear. The media elite are a homogenous and cosmopolitan
group . . . with differentially eastern, urban, ethnic, upper-status, and
secular roots.4

A number of political implications result from these characteristics:
Today’s leading journalists are politically liberal and alienated from
traditional norms and institutions. Most place themselves to the left
of center and regularly vote the Democratic ticket . . . . They would
like to strip traditional powerbrokers of their influence and empower
black leaders, consumer groups, intellectuals, and . . . the media.5

Some members of the media argue that they are apolitical. The most
authoritative studies of the media, however, based on extensive survey research,
indicate the opposite. That is, the great majority of those in the media elite and
in the profession as a whole tend to be left of center on the political spectrum,
with the media elite decidedly so.
Generally speaking, the term mind-set refers to the looking glass
through which an individual views the world.6 In this respect, even though
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some members of the media may claim that the media are not a monolith, the
fact is that the media elite displays a homogeneity of views and similarity of
mind-sets which considerably influence the entire news profession. The media
elite tends to perceive the world through its own lens, and this is reflected in
news reports, editorials, and in selecting what is to be reported on the evening
news. Although there may be some questions on the linkage between the views
of the media elite and the way the news is reported, it seems clear that “leading
journalists tend to perceive elements of social controversies in terms that correspond to their own attitudes.”7
Journalists perceive a world that is “peopled by brutal soldiers, corrupt
businessmen, and struggling underdogs.”8 While these views may be more
pronounced when interpreting domestic life, more often than not the same
attitudes are the basis for interpreting world events. Similarly, this leads many
in the media to view the US military in negative terms.
A commonality of media attitudes was also the conclusion reached in
an earlier study: “Because the New York Times, CBS Television News, NBC
Television News, the Washington Post, Newsweek, and Time exercise such inordinate direct and indirect influence over opinion, it is especially significant that
they tend to convey the same general viewpoint.”9
As noted earlier, the media elite mind-set and the way that elite perceives the world are sharply different from the mind-set and perceptions of
the public in general. This difference is also reflected in the attitudes of many
editors and reporters. For example, the results of a survey conducted by the Los
Angeles Times are particularly revealing. The survey indicated that the views
held by about 3,000 newspaper reporters and editors selected randomly from
about 600 newspapers around the country were at a considerable variance from
the views held by a slightly larger number of adult Americans. The portrait that
emerged is one of journalists who “are emphatically liberal on social issues
and foreign affairs, distrustful of establishment institutions (government, business, labor), and protective of their own economic interests.”10 Interestingly
enough, the survey pointed out that there was only a slight difference between
the views of the newspaper staffs and those of the higher-ups responsible for
setting editorial policy. One is led to conclude that many positions taken by the
media throughout the United States reflect those held by the media elite.
According to some studies, the media elite is obsessed with power.11
But the media are also ambivalent toward power. They tend to ignore their own
power, even belittle it, while being zealous in their criticism of other powerholders. This self-blindness is well documented in one study and referred to
frequently in others.12 The power of the media tends to be underestimated by
the media elite and overestimated by some segments of society. In any case, it
seems clear that the media have a substantial role in affecting the public. As
one study concluded,
To control what people will see and hear means to control the public’s
view of political reality. By covering certain news events, by simply
giving them space, the media signals the importance of these events
to the citizenry. By not reporting other activities, the media hides
portions of reality from everyone but the few people directly affected
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. . . . Events and problems placed on the national agenda by the media
excite public interest and become objects of government action.13

Another study notes, “A small number of people who work for a very
small number of news organizations exercise very great influence over the news
of national and international affairs received by all Americans.”14
The ability to shape the public’s image of reality and to affect its attitudes is surely a fundamental component of power. This power is reinforced by
the lack of consistent and effective counterbalancing forces within the media
elite. Pluralism in the American political-social system is a major factor in
counterbalancing forces and in checks and balances—a basic democratic characteristic. However, the media seems to be generally free from such internal
forces. This concentration and centralization not only add to the media’s power,
but strengthen its corporate character.
This is not to suggest that there is no internal conflict in the news
profession. There is a high degree of competitiveness, including commercial
competition. However, it rarely becomes institutionalized to the point of threatening the power of the media elite as a corporate body. Nor does this conflict
crystallize into effective balancing forces within the media.
The power of the media is considerably broadened and also strengthened with the introduction of new information technology. On that score, one
report concludes:
Essentially the same people who own and manage newspapers and
television now control the new technologies. They are guided by
the same elite-sanctioned values, the same desire for profit. New
journalistic . . . practices and effects will flourish, but technological
innovations are unlikely significantly to disrupt the structure of power
or undermine its legitimacy.15

Media power is not a new phenomenon, of course. Writing in the middle
of the 19th century, de Tocqueville observed that even with some restrictions,
“The power of the American press is still immense.” He went on to write,
“When many organs of the press do come to take the same line, their influence
in the long run is almost irresistible, and public opinion, continually stuck in
the same spot, ends by giving way under the blows.”16 In a modern version of
de Tocqueville, one scholar describes this phenomenon as “pack journalism.”17

The Media Monopoly and Media Miscues
The obsession with power, the character of the media elite, and the
commercial nature of news reporting combine to create a media monopoly.
According to Ben Bagdikian, this leads to considerable harm to the concept of
fair and balanced new reporting:
The continuing violations of the ethic of independent journalism over
the years has an important message for the future: The unstated rules
will be respected until they represent a threat to the power of the
media corporations. When the status of . . . media corporation . .
. is in jeopardy, or when the corporations believe their status is in
jeopardy, no conventions, no professional ethics, and no individual
protests by angered journalists will prevent corporations from using
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their prerogatives of ownership to protest their power by altering
news and other public information.18

Moreover, regardless of the existence of these conditions and power relationships, Bagdikian states that “there persists the illusion throughout American
journalism that it operates as a value-free discipline.”19
In sum, there is overwhelming evidence that there is a media elite that
has a monopoly on the media function in American society. Further, the media
elite exhibits political and social predispositions clearly separating it from
mainstream America. This raises a whole series of questions regarding access
to information networks by political actors, groups, or individuals who are
not part of the elite and who do not share the media elite’s political and social
predispositions. Can such political actors gain access to the vast network? Can
they expect to be treated fairly and objectively by the media elite? One is led to
believe that the answers to both questions are likely to be in the negative.
The members of the media elite, as is the case with most political
actors, have made serious mistakes in judgment leading to news distortions
and monumental errors. Members of the news profession are human, and like
all human beings they are imperfect. Errors are to be expected. The members
of the media elite, however, are reluctant to admit mistakes, and are not fond
of examination by outsiders. Indeed, when challenged by outside critics, the
media elite displays a siege mentality. For example, in a recent book by a media
professional, the author writes, “The American press has a responsibility to the
public. It must help keep Americans free by telling them the truth. It cannot
discharge this duty by hunkering down and waiting until its attackers go away.
It is time to fight back.”20
While a siege mentality may be a trait of other professions, it is a conspicuous characteristic of the media elite. What is disconcerting is that media errors
and distortions can take on a momentum of their own and become “historical
fact.” A classic example is the reporting of Tet 1968 during the Vietnam War.
In a comprehensive study of that event, journalist Peter Braestrup concluded,
What began as hasty initial reporting of disaster in Vietnam became
conventional wisdom when magnified in media commentary and
recycled on the hustings in New Hampshire, in campus protests, and
in discussions on Capital Hill. The press “rebroadcast” it all uncritically, even enthusiastically, although many in the news media should
have known better.21

The author concluded that “the general effect of the news media’s commentary
coverage of Tet in February-March 1968 was a distortion of reality—through
sins of omission and commission—on a scale that helped spur major repercussions in U.S. domestic politics, if not in foreign policy.”22 For a number of
military men in Vietnam during the Tet Offensive, it must have been ironical
to win a military victory, have it reported by American journalists as a defeat,
and have those reports accepted as fact by many Americans. Military men are
likely to agree, therefore, with one observer writing in the early part of 1970:
During the last decade the media elite has acted, at worst, as if it were
waging a studied propaganda campaign against the United States in
foreign affairs. At times it has acted as if it viewed itself as a neutral
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agent between the United States and its enemies . . . . It has largely
ignored specific foreign tactics, rather apparently designed to use our
own news media against us.23

The now famous 1984 case of General William Westmoreland and CBS
is another example of media miscues. According to Don Kowet,
The CBS documentary had charged a Westmoreland-led conspiracy.
Just as the military had anticipated, although fifteen years delayed,
CBS had gotten the story wrong, by relying on a paid consultant
whose account of events was tailored by his own bias, by allowing
a producer to avoid or discard interviews with those who might have
been able to rebut the documentary’s premise, and by ignoring documents in its own possession which tended to cast doubt on that thesis.24

Regarding the Westmoreland case, one study concludes, “It shows how a single
viewpoint, that of the executive producer, can shape the facts to conform to his
own version of the truth.”25
History is replete with such examples. In the Janet Cooke affair, for
example, the reporter had written a heart-wrenching story about “Jimmy,” an
eight-year-old drug addict living in Washington, D.C.26 Written in 1981, the
story earned a Pulitzer Prize. Subsequently, it was found that the story was a
fabrication and the Pulitzer was withdrawn. The Washington Post had little
choice but to publicly admit its error. But many were left wondering how an
error of such magnitude could have occurred in a major newspaper proclaiming
professional rigor and close editorial supervision. This episode was particularly
disconcerting given the fact that the newspaper has significant influence in
shaping public attitudes.
More disturbing is the view that “the media elite advocacy of certain
viewpoints and policies produced an additional new problem. Having diagnosed complex public problems, and having taken unequivocal public positions
on them, they apparently wish to demonstrate that they were right. They have
substantial journalistic and moral stake in proving their own rightness.”27
Some members of the media have responded to such criticism. One type of
response, based on the First Amendment, castigates media critics for their
anti-constitutionality. In such instances, the defense of journalists is based
primarily on the freedom of the press, interpreted broadly as “the people’s
right to know.” True, some in the media do spotlight the profession itself and
try to come to grips with internal problems. As one noted media professional,
Robert MacNeil, commented,
I think there is, frankly, scorn for fairness in some journalistic quarters . . . . There is an attitude common in the media that any good
journalist can apply common sense and quickly fathom what is right
and what is wrong in any complicated issue . . . . Coupled with this
attitude is one in which a reporter or camera crew acts as though their
presence, their action in covering a story, is more important than the
event they are covering.28

Yet, many in the media are included to brush aside such criticism by simply
saying, “We don’t make the news, we only report it.”
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A broader concern among journalists, perhaps, centers on manipulation. The media has been wary of being used or manipulated by various political
actors, particularly in the government. The use of leaks and testing the waters
by “unnamed sources” is a common technique. Various administrations have
been noted for such manipulation. But there are a variety of reasons for leaks,
ranging from those prompted by disgruntled bureaucrats to those from opposition members in Congress. Members of the media elite are quite conversant
with these methods and many times allow themselves to be used. There is also
some evidence to support the notion that members of the media themselves
manipulate the news. As noted earlier, members of the media elite tend to interpret events as fashioned by their own political and social dispositions.
The role of the media during the Kennedy Administration is a case
in point. According to an authoritative chronicler of the Kennedy era, John
H. Davis, the media virtually idolized the Kennedy family, with distortion
the result: “Kennedy’s phenomenal grace and charm belied an administration
whose style was hardly peace-loving. The discrepancy between image and
reality was due principally to the press.”29 In the aftermath of Kennedy’s
assassination, the media seemed to be out of touch with reality. Davis notes,
“Along with the glorification of John F. Kennedy, there went also his continued
idealization and sentimentalization. If the press had gushed over John Kennedy
before, it now became downright maudlin. The canonization had begun.30
Economist Holmes Brown makes a particularly strong case with
respect to news distortion and manipulation. In the article “TV Turns Good
Economic News into Bad,” he concludes: “The national economy improved
dramatically during 1983—but you might not have realized it if your only
source of information had been the nightly news programs of the three major
television networks.”31 Similar conclusions were reached in an earlier study
showing how media coverage of the 1968 presidential campaign and US policy
toward Vietnam, among other matters, was slanted to conform to the general
views of the media.32
The sources referred to here do not exhaust the list of available studies,
nor do their interpretations and conclusions necessarily preclude others. Yet,
these sources provide powerful support for the notion that the media are far
from being the virtuous profession claimed by their elite spokesmen, and far
from being balanced and fair in news interpretation and presentation. Though
without deliberate design, the media critics tend to reinforce much of the military professional’s own view.
With respect to the disapprobation of the media expressed by military
officers, it may well be that it goes much deeper than the familiar concerns of
suspect patriotism and irresponsibility in operational security matters. Rather,
the real concerns of military officers rest on the more fundamental questions
of news balance, fairness, compassion, and sincerity. Military men see these
qualities missing in today’s military reportage, in stark contrast to the situation
prevailing during “the Ernie Pyle era” of World War II. In this deeper sense,
then, their concern is not with levels of news coverage, but trustworthiness on
the part of newsmen.
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The question of trustworthiness was measured by a Gallup Poll taken
in July 1986. The poll assessed the public’s trust and confidence in ten key
American institutions. The military was rated highest, with 63 percent of the
respondents giving it a confidence rating of “a great deal” or “quite a lot.” In
sharp contrast, the American people showed much less confidence in television
and newspapers, with ratings of 27 and 37 percent respectively. While such
polls may change over time, the 1986 poll left no doubt about the public’s confidence with respect to the military and media. Six institutions out of ten were
rated above newspapers, with television rated tenth—that is, last—in public
confidence and trust.

Beyond the Surface, Beyond the Front Page
Clearly, there is more to the media and their role in American society
than addressed here. Further, there is a great deal more to explore regarding the view of the military profession. One does not have to meet or know
a reporter or TV journalist, however, to assess the political consequences of
news reporting. Reporters and TV journalists are met everyday by anyone who
reads newspapers and watches the nightly TV news. Of course, any serious
effort to examine the media must include a critical reading of the existing
literature. Such examination must include, for example, a study of the First
Amendment and its application to the media, and the concept of “the people’s
right to know.” The issues of US national security and media responsibility also
deserve detailed study.
Similarly, to understand the military, with its special responsibility,
requires a serious study of the military profession. This cannot be achieved
simply by serving a few years in the Army or Navy while waiting to get out.
It requires critical mastery of the important literature as well as thorough
and continuing practical knowledge of the national and international security
arenas, the military profession, military life, and the military system. Too few
of the media elite have accomplished this.
Solutions to problems arising out of the relationship between the
military and the media require understanding the challenges, dilemmas, and
responsibilities facing both the military and the media. Understanding may be
better achieved by not expecting a “solution,” since this presumes that there is a
fixed answer, relevant for all times, and that there is a beginning and an end to
a particular problem. The dynamics among political actors in American politics
and the constantly changing political climate make the search for solutions
to a “proper” media role elusive, if not misguided. The most one can expect
is a dynamic relationship, with episodic attention to power relationships and
demands for accuracy and balance.
In the modern era, with all its technological innovations, the media elite
will surely pay an even greater role in agenda-setting and in shaping public
attitudes. At the same time, opportunities will increase for news distortions and
political biases in selecting what to report. The media elite will be increasingly
vulnerable to such conditions, and these conditions will place an increased
burden on the news profession. It is a profession wrought with challenges and
dilemmas, and increasing pressures for balance and fairness. It is difficult,
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indeed impossible, to achieve absolute objectivity, particularly when individuals are trying to gather and report news under pressures of time and events.
But at the minimum, we should expect—and demand—that the members of
the media elite recognize their own characteristics, predispositions, and weaknesses, the commercial imprint on news reporting, and their influence over the
news profession.
In the final analysis, it is well to remember the words of de Tocqueville:
“I admit that I do not feel toward freedom of the press that complete and instantaneous love which one accords to things by their nature supremely good. I
love it more from considering the evils it prevents than on account of the good
it does.”33
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